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Economics, Law & Institutions:  
The Shaping of Chinese Competition Law 
David J. Gerber∗ 
ABSTRACT 
China has been considering enactment of an anti-monopoly 
(antitrust) law since 1993, and it has now enacted such a law. Given 
the potential importance of this legislation, there is much uncertainty 
about what the enactment means and what roles it is likely to play in 
influencing the development of the Chinese economy. This article 
applies a neo-institutionalist analysis in examining some of the 
factors that have influenced the shaping of the legislation and that 
are likely to influence the operation of competition law and its 
organizations. The main argument is that the central dynamic in both 
the creation of the statute and its structuring has been the interaction 
of Chinese economic policy institutions with foreign pressures 
(institutional mechanisms intended to “push” the Chinese decision 
makers in certain directions) and foreign cognitive influence 
(cognitive factors that accord influence to foreign organizations, 
experience, and laws). These interactions also provide insights into 
how the law is likely to be applied. The paper also explores these two 
concepts—foreign pressure and foreign cognitive influence—in 
relation to the theory of institutional change. 
 
 ∗ Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. This Article is based 
on a presentation at the annual meeting of the International Society for the New Institutional 
Economics, Boulder, Colorado, September 2006. An earlier version was presented at a 
conference of the East Asian Law Center at Harvard Law School in May 2006. I would like to 
thank participants at both conferences for their valuable comments on the presentation. 
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China has been considering enactment of a competition law since 
1993, and in August of 2007 it finally enacted such a law.1 Enactment 
and enforcement can be expected to impact the Chinese economy, 
perhaps in significant ways. As a result, there is considerable interest 
and concern in many countries, especially the United States, about 
what to expect from the new law.2 In particular, there is speculation 
about how such a law is likely to be interpreted and enforced. 
Questions such as “Will it be enforced seriously?”, “Who will 
enforce it?”, and “Will it be enforced primarily (and perhaps 
discriminatorily) to the conduct of foreign firms?” are commonly 
heard. 
There has, however, been little systematic study of how these 
questions might be answered or even of how useful insights into 
these developments might be generated. The internal workings of 
legal and political decision processes in China are far from 
transparent, especially for those viewing the situation from outside 
China. As a result, there is often little information available for use in 
assessing the dynamics of those processes. In this Article, I offer 
some analytical tools that can provide insight into the evolution of 
competition law in China and thereby into the factors that are likely 
to influence its operations in the future. These tools have potentially 
far broader application. I expect them to prove valuable for analyzing 
any situation in which a national or local law is or may be influenced 
by legal developments or factors beyond its borders, especially in the 
context of economic globalization, but I leave that topic for future 
exploration. 
 
 1.  Zhong Hua Ren Min Gong He Guo Fan Long Duan Fa, at http://www.5dka.cn/ 
flfg/2007-08/30/content_732591.htm.  For an English translation, see Nathan Bush, The PRC 
Anti-Monopoly Law: Unanswered Questions and Challenges Ahead, ANTITRUST SOURCES, 
Oct. 2007, available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/07/10/Oct07-Bush10-18f.pdf. 
For detailed discussion of the development of the legislation, see H. Stephen Harris, Jr., The 
Making of an Antitrust Law: The Pending Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of 
China, 7 CHICAGO J. INT’L L. 169, 174–83 (2006). 
 2. An indication of this interest is the American Bar Association’s submission of a 
detailed set of comments on the proposed anti-monopoly law to the Chinese. See JOINT 
SUBMISSION OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION’S SECTIONS OF ANTITRUST LAW AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE ON THE PROPOSED ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (2003), http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-comments/2003/07-
03/jointsubmission.pdf. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/12
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My basic claim here is that in seeking to comprehend the 
development of competition law in China, there is much value in an 
analysis that identifies the following three sets of factors and that 
accounts for their interaction. These three sets of factors have 
interacted to influence the development of the Chinese competition 
legislation thus far, and are likely to influence its implementation 
going forward. Each set operates on domestic decision makers; the 
relative force of the sets and their inter-relationships shape the 
decisional landscape that the decision makers inhabit. First is the 
domestic incentive structure—i.e., the set of incentives derived from 
and created by domestic institutions, particularly, the need for 
political support. The second set of factors is “cognitive” or 
“epistemic.” It refers to the knowledge base in foreign law and 
general experience that is available to Chinese decision makers in this 
area. Competition law is new to China, and thus foreign influence has 
been particularly instrumental in creating legislation and shaping 
thought about issues relating to it. The third set of factors includes 
foreign institutional pressure. Chinese decision makers must respond 
not only to domestic-source incentives, but also to incentives from 
the external political, legal and institutional contexts within which 
they must act.  
The analysis I use here provides explanatory and predictive force 
by identifying such factors, tracing their roles in the creation and 
shaping of the legislation, and showing how they can be expected to 
influence its implementation. This analysis applies and further 
develops tools that I have sketched in previous work,3 and also draws 
on analytical insights from scholars in the area of new institutional 
economics in the sense that it focuses on analyzing the interests and 
incentives of individuals and institutions.4 It uses these tools, 
 
 3. See, e.g., David J. Gerber, System Dynamics: Toward a Language of Comparative 
Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 719, 726–33 (1998).  
 4. For recent leading work in this field, see, e.g., THE FRONTIERS OF THE NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS (John N. Drobak & John V. C. Nye eds., 1997). The foundational 
work of Douglass North has been of particular value in this context. See generally DOUGLASS 
C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990); 
DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY (1981).  
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however, in ways that have not, to my knowledge, been 
systematically explored.5  
This brief Article first sketches these sets of analytical tools. It 
then applies them to the development of competition legislation in 
China, probing the factors that have been at work there. It looks at the 
impetus for competition law, then the process of shaping the 
legislation, and, finally, the factors that are likely to influence the 
operation of the system created to implement the legislation. 
I. ELEMENTS OF THE ANALYSIS  
A. Competition Law: Identity and Basic Roles 
“Competition law” here refers to a legal regime in which the 
stated objective is to prevent restraints on the competitive process by 
economic actors.6 Such a regime typically contains norms that are 
intended to deter economic actors from engaging in conduct that 
reduces the effectiveness of market processes.7 It may, for example, 
prohibit cartels—i.e. agreements among competitors to reduce 
competition between themselves—and contracts in which a 
manufacturer or distributor controls the conduct of actors further 
down the distribution chain in ways that harm competition. Merger 
controls are also common in competition law systems, as are controls 
on certain forms of unilateral conduct by dominant firms. This form 
of law plays a unique role in the sense that it creates and enforces 
 
 5. Bruce Carruthers and Terry Halliday have done valuable work in related fields that 
contribute to understanding the relationships between domestic legislation and globalization 
processes. See Terence C. Halliday & Bruce G. Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law: Global 
Norm-Making and National Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corporate Insolvency Regimes, 
112 AM. J. SOC. 1135 (2007); Bruce G. Carruthers & Terence C. Halliday, Negotiating 
Globalization: Global Scripts and Intermediation in the Construction of Asian Insolvency 
Systems, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 521 (2006). The theme is also developed in PITTMAN B. 
POTTER, THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM: GLOBALIZATION AND LOCAL LEGAL CULTURE (2001). 
 6. In the United States, this type of legal regime is referred to as “antitrust law”, but in 
much of the world, including China, the preferred term is “competition law.” In some contexts 
the latter term is used more broadly to cover both “antitrust law” and “unfair competition law.” 
 7. For comparative discussion of competition law, see David J. Gerber, Comparative 
Antitrust Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1193 (Mathias Reimann & 
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) and David J. Gerber, Competition Law, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 510 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/12
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public norms that interfere with the “free” competitive process in 
order to deter or prevent private interferences with that process.  
When implemented, competition law can shape both the market 
and the state. It not only shapes the incentive structure of business 
firms, but it also gives public officials particular forms of authority 
for influencing markets, which can influence relationships both 
among public agents and between public institutions and private 
actors. Moreover, competition law has a potentially powerful 
symbolic-expressive function. It represents symbolically the 
relationship between economic and political processes, articulating 
the political system’s normative claims about the proper relationship 
between the market, society and the political system.  
Competition law often has a transnational dimension, even when 
it does not intend specifically to influence transnational conduct. 
Such a regime may have direct influence, for example, where a state 
applies its competition law to conduct outside its territory and thus 
directly affects the incentives of firms that fall within its 
jurisdictional orbit. In addition, however, it may have indirect effects. 
Markets are economic institutions, and as such they are in themselves 
not limited by political boundaries. The incentive to sell extends to 
wherever there are potential buyers, and the incentive to purchase 
extends to wherever there are potential sellers. A state may use its 
control of its own borders to create artificial, political boundaries for 
markets, but without government intervention market incentives are 
not coterminous with political borders. As a consequence, where a 
competition law regime alters market incentives and the conditions of 
operation in one part of a transnational market, it indirectly 
influences all participants in the market. For example, it may alter 
investment incentives within its territory, thereby influencing the 
flow of capital to other markets and areas. It may also deter certain 
forms of conduct within its sphere of application (or “jurisdiction”) 
thereby changing incentives to engage in such conduct outside its 
territory.  
B. Decisional Factors 
In order to generate insights into the development and operations 
of a competition law regime, it is necessary to use analytical tools 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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designed specifically for that purpose and capable of identifying all 
potentially relevant factors. Therefore, I use decisions as the focal 
point of the analysis and ask what kinds of factors influence decisions 
relating to competition law. I use the term “decision” broadly, 
referring to all acts that are related to the creation, promulgation or 
implementation of competition law norms. This focus on decisions 
provides a method of identifying influences from all potentially 
relevant sources. It also enables the analyst to relate those influences 
to each other at the precise point in which they exercise influence.8 In 
the context of Chinese competition law, the potential transnational 
importance of the decisions that Chinese officials make regarding 
competition law has led to intense international pressure and scrutiny, 
and this requires (1) that the analysis register both foreign and 
domestic elements and (2) that it have the capacity to relate the 
decisional influences to each other. The relationship among 
influences is the critical factor.  
1. Domestic Incentive Structure 
The domestic incentive structure is necessarily central to this 
analysis. Legislative and administrative decision makers depend on 
the support of domestic institutions and the related interest groups 
and constituencies for political support (as well as their jobs and 
incomes). Typically, these institutions and constituencies represent 
the primary influence on such decisions.9 All other sources of 
influence are likely to depend on how they relate to domestic 
institutions and incentives for their effect. For example, if a foreign 
influence is perceived by Chinese decision makers as associated with 
particular domestic incentives and interests, this association is likely 
to affect its influence on those decision makers. 
In the context of competition law decisions, three decisional 
influences are particularly prominent. One includes the internal 
political (or “domestic-power-related”) incentives of those who make 
 
 8. For discussion, see Gerber, supra note 3, at 728–33. 
 9. Under some circumstances, non-domestic institutions move to center stage, as in the 
case of the Asian financial crisis of 1997, when countries such as Indonesia had little choice but 
to heed the requests of foreign lending institutions that they change their laws in specific ways. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/12
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such decisions. Each official involved has incentives to preserve or 
increase her own power and authority as well as the power and 
authority of the institutions with which she is associated. This power 
may translate into personal benefits such as higher personal 
compensation as well as institutional benefits such as higher budgets 
for the institution with which the decision maker is associated. 
Competition law in China involves particularly complex and 
multi-faceted incentive structures because of the role of the state in 
the economy.10 The central government is itself an important player 
in the economic picture. Not only are many large companies still 
owned by the state, but government bodies also influence many 
forms of economic conduct through mechanisms such as regulatory 
regimes, licensing, controls on credit, and various other requirements 
for governmental approval. Managers of state enterprises thus have 
incentives to protect the conduct range and profits of their business 
operations as well as the personal and institutional benefits that 
derive from their roles as intermediaries between the state and the 
markets in which they operate.  
Ideologies are a second component of this incentive structure. 
Where a government or other institution announces that it is pursuing 
specified ideological goals (such as social equality) or that it is 
motivated by particular ideological considerations, this creates 
incentives to take actions that are likely to be interpreted as consistent 
with these ideological claims. The impact of such incentives varies 
greatly, depending on factors such as the power of the institution, the 
degree to which discrepancies between ideological goals and actual 
implementation are perceived as harmful to groups within the society, 
and the capacity of such groups to exert political pressure on the 
institution to reduce the discrepancy. Given that an institution can 
change its articulated ideological commitments, it can mitigate the 
effect of such incentives, but it can seldom do so without political 
cost. 
China’s political leadership has ideological commitments that 
relate to competition law,11 and they represent a potentially important 
 
 10. For discussion, see, e.g., STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN 
CHINA AFTER MAO 102–37 (1999). 
 11. See Joint statement of the 10th China-EU Summit, Beijing, Nov. 28, 2007, available 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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part of the incentive structure facing decision makers involved with 
competition law. In particular, government rhetoric emphasizes the 
need to achieve fairness within the economic system.12 This might, 
for example, justify considering firm size in enforcing competition 
law, either by applying the law more strictly to larger firms or 
providing exceptions or other advantages for smaller firms. Another 
example is the government’s growing ideological commitment to the 
“rule of law.”13 Although what the government means by that term is 
not always clear, the basic idea tends to support enactment and 
enforcement of competition law, because such a move at least 
appears to diminish the discretion of central government officials. It 
signals that state intervention in the economy is subject to legal 
processes rather than merely being controlled by political 
predilections and personal gain. 
A third set of incentives comes from economic processes 
themselves. Institutions require financial resources, and thus they 
have incentives to take decisions that will tend to increase available 
funds. Although this may include strategies for seeking transfer 
payments (e.g., foreign aid or government loans) it also often 
includes strategies for increasing the effectiveness of domestic 
markets. These economic forces are not subject to government 
control. They have their own logic and create their own imperatives. 
Chinese governments on all levels (national, provincial and local) 
have come to recognize over the last twenty years that whatever their 
political objectives might be, they need to develop markets in order to 
achieve many of them.14 Although the degree of emphasis on market 
forces varies among Chinese government institutions and over time 
within the same institutions, market imperatives are now recognized 
as of major importance.15 In China, much of the emphasis over the 
 
at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t386520.htm.  
 12. See, e.g., DALI YANG, REMAKING THE CHINESE LEVIATHAN: MARKET TRANSITION 
AND THE POLITICS OF GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 65–109 (2004). 
 13. For discussion, see RANDALL A. PEERENBOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD THE 
RULE OF LAW (2002) and Albert H.Y. Chen, Discussion in Contemporary China on the Rule of 
Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE PACIFIC RIM 13 (2000). 
 14. See Yang, supra note 12, at 25–64. 
 15. Randall Peerenboom, Law and Development of Constitutional Democracy in China: 
Problem or Paradigm?, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 185, 225 (2005). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/12
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last two decades has been on attracting foreign capital as a means of 
achieving economic development. This has been highly successful, 
and it remains a focus of government efforts. The strategies needed to 
keep investment flowing into the country are, however, themselves 
contestable and changing. In addition, there is growing awareness 
that more attention needs to be paid to increasing the efficiency of 
indigenous Chinese economic processes, for example, by 
encouraging domestic entrepreneurs and by reducing government 
interference with market competition.16 
The impact of market incentives depends on perceptions. In 
particular, it depends on the perceived effectiveness of foreign and 
domestic policies aimed at the development of markets as well as on 
perceptions of the applicability of foreign experience to domestic 
policy choices. Not least, it depends on the confidence of decision 
makers in available forms of economic theory and in particular 
sources of expertise.  
2. Foreign Cognitive Influences  
A second set of decisional influences acting on competition law 
relates to the knowledge base for decisions—what I call “cognitive 
influences.” Here I use the term “cognitive” (or “epistemic”) to refer 
to all aspects of “knowing”—such as what data is available, how it is 
interpreted, how interpretations relate to each other, and how 
knowledge is located in and transferred within institutions. In short, 
what kinds of information do the decision makers have and how do 
they structure and interpret it.  
Of particular concern here is knowledge about foreign 
competition law and experience. The relative intellectual isolation of 
Chinese scholars and leaders before 1990 and continuing linguistic 
and practical limits on access to foreign legal materials combine to 
give this issue poignancy for the analysis of competition law 
development. The extent to which such knowledge influences 
specific decisions depends on factors such as the status of the 
information, the political and cultural values applied in interpreting 
 
 16. See, e.g., SHAHID YUSUF, KAORU NABESHIMA & DWIGHT H. PERKINS, UNDER NEW 
OWNERSHIP: PRIVATIZING CHINA’S STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 1–40, 77–113 (2006). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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and assessing it, and the concepts and categories that shape its 
cognition.17  
3. Foreign Institutional Pressure 
Finally, a distinct set of decisional factors includes foreign 
institutional pressure. It is important to distinguish institutional 
pressure from the just-mentioned category of cognitive influences. 
The two are commonly not distinguished, but failure to see them as 
separate and distinct can undermine effective analysis and 
assessment. 
I use the term “institutional pressure” to refer to situations in 
which one institution explicitly or implicitly sets performance criteria 
for the conduct of another institution and signals that it will reward 
fulfillment of these criteria and possibly punish the failure to achieve 
them. The extent of such pressure depends on factors such as, for 
example, the clarity and precision of the performance criteria, the 
means used in evaluating compliance, the probability that sanctions 
will actually be imposed or rewards provided, and the potential 
impact of such sanctions and rewards.  
The issue of competition law in China has elicited pressure from 
numerous foreign organizations. In general, such pressure has been 
understated and, frequently, indirect. Chinese officials have shown 
little willingness to respond favorably to overt and direct pressure 
with regard to their domestic legislation, and thus efforts to apply 
pressure have typically been non-confrontational, and the suggestion 
of rewards and sanctions has often been implied or concealed from 
public view.  
These three sets of decisional influences relate to each other in 
many ways. For purposes of the analysis here, however, the essential 
point is that they interact in influencing decisions, specifically, the 
decisions of relevant Chinese officials and scholars. An analytical 
focus on the concept of “decisions” thus provides tools for effective 
analysis of the dynamics of competition law in China. 
 
 17. For discussion of factors that shape the development of competition law, particularly 
in its early stages, see DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY 
EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUS 10–15 (1998). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/12
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II. THE IMPETUS FOR CHINESE COMPETITION LAW 
I now apply this analysis to Chinese competition law, looking first 
at the incentives for China to enact a competition law.18 Foreign 
pressure and foreign cognitive influence have provided an impetus 
for the enactment of competition law, but there are also domestic 
incentives that push in the same direction. 
Foreign institutional pressure has played a significant role in 
inducing Chinese officials to enact a competition law.19 In particular, 
international institutions have encouraged China to take this step. 
One major factor has been China’s entry into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO).20 Although WTO membership does not 
specifically create an obligation on members to enact a competition 
law, it does create general obligations for members to avoid 
distortions to market competition,21 and competition law can serve as 
a proxy for a country’s willingness to take seriously that obligation. 
In that capacity it signals the government’s willingness to allow its 
economy to operate on market principles. For Chinese officials, 
enacting such a law represents a way of signaling its desire to expand 
its role in the international system, and such signals can be of value in 
gaining acceptance and support for such expansion. 
 
 18. For discussion of incentive issues in the context of Chinese competition law, see 
Bruce M. Owen, Su Sun, Wentong Zheng, Antitrust in China: The Problem of Incentive 
Compatibility, J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 123 (2005). 
 19. The Chinese competition law has developed under conditions that differ dramatically 
from those under which competition law developed in the United States and Europe. In those 
western contexts, domestic decision makers looked basically to their own needs and political 
incentives in developing the law. In China, by contrast, the potential importance of the law has 
drawn enormous interest and much pressure from outside the country, and this has required 
Chinese decision makers to at least pay careful attention to these outside factors, if not to be 
influenced by them. 
 20. For discussion of the impact of WTO accession on China’s legal system, see Donald 
C. Clarke, China’s Legal System and the WTO: Prospects for Compliance, 2 WASH. U. 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 97 (2003). 
 21. United States—Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, Panel Report adopted on Nov. 7, 
1989, B.I.S.D.36S/386, para. 5.11; Canada—Administration of the Foreign Investment Review 
Act, Panel Report adopted 7 February 1984, B.I.S.D. 30S/140, 159-161, paras. 5.7-5.11; 
Canada—Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Marketing 
Agencies,” DS17/R, Panel Report adopted on 18 February 1992, B.I.S.D. 39S/27, 75–76, para. 
5.5  
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Foreign cognitive influence also tends to support the enactment of 
such a law. Chinese leaders are aware that most developed countries 
have competition laws and that there is a widespread belief that these 
laws contribute to economic development. They also know that a 
competition law is now generally considered to be an all but 
necessary part of the legal framework supporting such an economy. It 
follows that if China wishes to have a fully-developed market 
economy, it should also have such a law. 
Domestic incentives to enact a competition law have not been 
strong, and there has been opposition to the idea within the 
government, but on balance they seem to have provided support for 
competition law. General political agendas have played a significant 
role in shaping these incentives. One factor has been the claim that 
such a law will benefit consumers.22 The government has in recent 
years paid increasing attention to consumer issues, and enactment of 
a competition law has the attraction of promising protection to 
consumers and thereby acknowledging their importance. Competition 
law also has the advantage of doing this without creating specific 
short-term expectations among consumers that the government might 
not be able to meet.  
A second strand of support comes from the potential benefits that 
such a law can yield for the economy. Ideally, it can improve the 
competitive process and thereby increase economic efficiency. 
Businesses and government officials at all levels recognize the need 
to improve the efficiency of the Chinese economy, and thus the 
potential for competition law to lead to those improvements provides 
an incentive for support from within the private sectors as well as the 
bureaucracy. This claim also relates to the potential for increased 
efficiency to improve the distribution of wealth in China. President 
Hu Jintao has repeatedly emphasized the government’s support for 
“spreading wealth” within Chinese society,23 and enactment of a 
competition law can be adduced as proof that the government is 
 
 22. See generally Wang Xiaoye, The Prospect of Antimonopoly Legislation in China, 1 
WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 201 (2002). 
 23. See Full text of Hu Jintao’s report at the 17th National Congress, Part VIII. 
Accelerating Social Development with the Focus on Improving People’s Livelihood, available 
at http://english.people.com.cn, Oct. 15, 2007. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/12
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acting on that promise, because improving the competitive process 
may lead to greater opportunities for individuals and enterprises 
throughout the country and the society.24 This is another important 
area in which the government has curried support from the populace 
in general as well as from business interests. The strength of this 
incentive depends in part on the government’s rhetoric and its 
intentions regarding the spread of wealth within Chinese society. 
Finally, competition law is often associated with rule of law 
issues. A competition law signals that the government intends to 
support the centrality of the market as a means of allocating resources 
within the society and that, therefore, the economy is governed by 
laws rather than by the government bureaucracy. This tends to blunt 
concerns about official bribery and other improper governmental 
influences on the economy.  
Nevertheless, there has also been significant domestic opposition 
to enactment of a competition law. In particular, State Owned 
Enterprises (SOEs) have been a major factor in delaying enactment of 
such a law.25 For them, competition law represents a threat, because it 
can interfere with their managerial discretion and the means by which 
they seek to maintain the market power that they have achieved 
through their connections with government officials. For example, it 
may restrict the kinds of agreements that such a firm may use to deter 
new entrants into markets in which it has acquired monopoly status 
on the basis of government support, but in which the government has 
begun to withdraw such support. The strength of SOE resistance may 
be reduced, however, by their recognition that mere enactment of a 
competition law does not necessarily create problems for them. Its 
impact on them will depend on the extent to which it is enforced 
against them, and they may have grounds for believing that their ties 
to political decision makers will afford them special privileges in the 
context of enforcement.26  
 
 24. For discussion of concern with such imbalances, see, e.g., Joseph Kahn, China 
Worries About Economic Surge That Skips the Poor, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2005, at A10. 
 25. See, e.g., Lillian Yang, Anti-Monopoly Law for Review, S. CHINA MORNING POST, 
Nov. 7, 2006, Westlaw 2006 WLNR 19250668 and Owen, supra note 18, at 130–31. For 
discussion of the need to focus on State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the implementation of the 
anti-monopoly act, see Wang supra note 22. 
 26. For analysis of the role of SOEs in the Chinese economy, see BARRY NAUGHTON, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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III. SHAPING THE STATUTE 
The process of deciding on the contents of a Chinese competition 
statute has encountered some of the same influences, in sometimes 
modified form, as well as new decisional influences. Here there are 
more issues, and they are more complicated. It is not just “yes or 
no”—competition law or not. Decision makers have to make many 
choices among many alternatives. My objective here is not to analyze 
these influences with reference to specific provisions, but rather to 
identify patterns of influence. Such analysis reveals sets of factors 
that have not been picked up by other analytical lenses. 
Given that the Chinese have no experience with a general 
competition law,27 they have had little choice but to refer to foreign 
experience and to look at foreign models in the drafting process. In 
order to acquire relevant information, the government has itself 
sought out information and opinions from foreign sources, especially 
since about 2000. The government and the Chinese Academy of 
Social Science have, for example, brought foreign experts to China 
for conferences and discussions on several occasions, and officials 
and scholars have made several study trips to the United States and 
Europe for this purpose. Foreign governments and international 
organizations have also sought out discussions with the relevant 
Chinese officials. Officials from the United States, Europe, Germany, 
Japan, Australia, and Korea have traveled to Beijing to discuss 
competition law issues and perhaps to seek to influence the contents 
of the law.  
This process has intertwined influences from each of the 
categories identified here, but foreign cognitive influences and 
foreign institutional pressures have been particularly important. 
Nevertheless, Chinese officials have not viewed the shaping of the 
statute as a process of pure “borrowing.” They have emphasized the 
 
THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSITIONS AND GROWTH 295–329 (2007), and Yang, supra note 
12, at 65–109 (2004). 
 27. There are, of course, specific provisions in some Chinese legislation that have 
competition law related objectives. For a current review of these items, see CHAO JIN & WEI 
LUO, COMPETITION LAW IN CHINA (2002) and Maher M. Dabbah, The Development of Sound 
Competition Law and Policy in China: An (Im)possible Dream?, 30 WORLD COMP. L. REV. 
341, 345–47 (2007). 
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need to create a competition law that is specifically adapted to the 
Chinese political and economic context.28 
A. Foreign Cognitive Influence 
The lack of prior Chinese experience with competition law has 
given cognitive influence a particularly prominent role. The Chinese 
have seriously sought to understand foreign experience and to use it 
in the creation of their own competition law. This influence has 
numerous components. 
1. The Knowledge Base and Access to Information 
One factor is the knowledge base to which the drafters have had 
access during the drafting process. Here the central questions are 
“Who knew what?”, “When did they know it?”, and “How did they 
acquire the information—from which sources and in which 
contexts?” The breadth of such questions requires, of course, highly 
generalized responses. Nevertheless, the circle of decision makers in 
this area is relatively small, and we can at least identify some general 
patterns in the availability of particular kinds of knowledge.  
At the beginning of the process of drafting a competition law (i.e., 
the mid-1990s) knowledge of competition law among Chinese 
officials and scholars was very limited. Few had studied foreign laws 
or experience in any great depth. Even today, only a few scholars 
have studied foreign competition laws and experiences systematically 
and in-depth.29 There are relatively few books and in-depth articles 
on foreign competition laws and experience available in Chinese. 
This tends to give heightened influence to those few experts and 
sources, but it also means that Chinese decision makers acquire much 
of their knowledge of foreign law and experience through discussions 
with foreign officials and scholars, who have, of course, their own 
 
 28. See, e.g., Dongsheng Li, Deputy Dir.-Gen., State Admin. for Industry and Commerce 
(SAIC), Comments at International Competition Law Forum, Beijing: China Needs an Antitrust 
Law (June 18, 2005), available at www.saic.gov.cn/hdxw/news.asp?newsid=771. 
 29. This situation is likely to change dramatically over the next five to ten years as 
significant numbers of Chinese students go to the United States and Europe to study 
competition law. 
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interests and agendas. In general, therefore, the knowledge to which 
these decision makers have had access during the drafting process has 
often been relatively thin and sometimes selective and potentially 
misleading. Careful and analytical comparisons of the applicability of 
U.S. and European competition law to the situation in China have 
been particularly rare.  
The content of that knowledge base includes information 
primarily about U.S. and European experience, although the Chinese 
have also paid significant attention to Japanese and Korean 
experience. Material in English tends to be most easily accessible to 
Chinese officials, who seldom read foreign languages other than 
English, and these sources naturally tend to feature U.S. law. This 
means that with regard to U.S. law, Chinese officials and scholars can 
acquire and read articles, books, and other materials far more easily, 
and with significantly lower cost, than materials about other systems 
written in less accessible languages. Moreover, for reasons mentioned 
above, the incentives to study it are particularly strong.  
Aside from U.S. antitrust law, the most developed national system 
(excluding the E.U.’s regional system) has been German competition 
law,30 but there is apparently relatively limited knowledge of German 
among Chinese officials. This means that information about German 
development tends to come primarily from the few Chinese experts 
that have studied it carefully, from discussions with German officials 
and scholars, and from the limited materials about German law 
available in English. While valuable, these forms of information are 
necessarily more limited and generally more superficial than 
knowledge about U.S. law. Nevertheless, the most influential Chinese 
expert in the area, Prof. Wang Xiaoye of the Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences (CASS) received a Ph.D. in competition law in 
Germany and has conveyed much information about German 
competition law in Chinese. A further hindrance to in-depth study of 
German law is the fact that since 2004, it has lost much of its 
autonomy, as it has become part of the “modernized” European 
competition law system. 
 
 30. See, e.g., DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY 
EUROPE 266–333 (1998, pbk ed., 2001). 
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The type of information available is particularly important in this 
context. In general, incentives are greatest for Chinese officials to 
gather information on current substantive law, generally including 
statutory provisions and sometimes including case law, and 
information about the current practices of foreign competition 
authorities. This kind of information appears most directly useful to 
Chinese officials, and it is also the type of information that is most 
easily acquired. For many purposes, however, it is not the most useful 
information, because information about the current law can provide 
little, if any, assistance in analyzing what might be valuable and 
appropriate for China and what kinds of factors might influence 
further developments and consequences in China. For that purpose, it 
is necessary to carefully and comparatively examine actual 
experience with these norms and institutions. Some officials 
recognize the importance of such material for making useful 
comparisons with the situation in China, but this kind of information 
is more difficult to obtain and evaluate.31  
2. Status of Information 
In assessing the influence of information about foreign 
competition law, it is necessary to examine not only what the 
knowledge base contains, but the status of the information it contains. 
This refers to the weight or value attached to it by decision makers. 
There are, of course, many different pieces of information and many 
factors that can affect valuations, but we can identify major patterns 
of influence. Again, the claims here are necessarily broad. The 
objective is merely to identify factors that enhance or reduce the 
status of information.  
The status of information about U.S. antitrust law is heavily 
conflicted. Several factors tend to enhance its status among the 
relevant Chinese decision makers, while others undermine that status. 
The status-enhancing factors include the general image of the U.S. 
antitrust system as the “father” (“mother” would be a better term) of 
 
 31. One measure of the presence of such interest is the publication in China of a Chinese 
translation of my long and detailed study of the development of competition law in Europe. 
DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH CENTURY EUROPE (1998).  
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antitrust laws. The U.S. antitrust laws were the first to play a 
significant role in national legal and economic development, and U.S. 
experience with antitrust law has been far more extensive than 
experience with such laws elsewhere. There is a very large number of 
reported antitrust cases, many of which contain detailed factual 
material as well as analysis of legal and factual issues. The cases 
have spanned many years and dealt with an exceptionally wide range 
of issues and circumstances. Moreover, the academic and practical 
literature on U.S. antitrust law is far more extensive than such 
literature elsewhere.32 This makes U.S. antitrust a particularly 
valuable source of information and creates incentives for scholars and 
officials to study it. Some even assume that this extensive experience 
must have led to a particularly sophisticated and developed antitrust 
model.33 Moreover, U.S. antitrust law is associated with U.S. 
economic successes, especially since the early 1990s, and this tends 
to enhance its appeal to Chinese leaders, who seek similar economic 
successes.  
Another factor that enhances the status of U.S. antitrust law is its 
international role. It is the antitrust law system that is best known and 
most emulated around the world and thus for many it serves as a kind 
of proxy for a global standard. In addition, many assume that the 
power and influence of the United States will tend to lead all 
countries to converge their antitrust systems toward that of the United 
States. This further increases the potential value to the Chinese of 
understanding and perhaps emulating that system. 
Finally, the U.S. model of competition law is backed by the power 
and influence of U.S. government officials, law firms, economists 
and management advisory firms. For example, in international 
conferences regarding competition law and in international 
organizations such as the International Competition Network (ICN) 
and the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
 
 32. For discussion of the role of U.S. antitrust law in thinking about competition law 
outside the United States, see GERBER, COMPARATIVE ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 7. 
 33. The long experience of the United States has clearly produced a sophisticated 
competition law, but that does not, of course, render it likely to be useful in the institutional 
context of China. For discussion of the potential value of U.S. experience for China, see David 
J. Gerber, Constructing Competition Law in China: The Potential Value of European and U.S. 
Experience, 3 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 315 (2004). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/12
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(OECD), US officials, lawyers, economists, and scholars often play 
leading roles. They tend to support strongly the basic U.S. model of 
competition law and assume it to be appropriate everywhere. This 
further enhances its status among Chinese decision makers. 
On the other hand, there are also factors that reduce the status of 
that information. One is the reverse of the medallion noted above. 
U.S. officials’ and institutions’ use of their status and power to 
“push” China in a particular direction may be seen as a form of 
coercion, and there is at least anecdotal evidence that some Chinese 
leaders and officials are inclined to resist such pressures. More 
fundamentally, the uniqueness of the U.S. experience with antitrust 
law tends to weaken claims that the U.S. model of antitrust law 
would be appropriate for China.34 
Although information about European competition law appears to 
be significantly more limited than information about US antitrust law, 
it has also been influential. The draft Chinese legislation tends to 
follow generally a “European” model, and in that context the impact 
of German competition law is particularly strong.35 In part, this may 
be due to the traditionally high status of European legal systems, in 
particular German law, in China. The Chinese legal system features 
many characteristics that have been derived from German and other 
European laws, often as transmitted through Japanese law.36 This 
tends to support claims that a European-style system would be most 
appropriate for China, because it would “fit” better into the Chinese 
legal system. 
Finally, Chinese officials and scholars have also had access to 
significant amounts of information about Japanese and Korean 
competition law and experience, and that knowledge seems to have 
been accorded relatively high status. Given that there are many 
 
 34. Id. at 319–21. 
 35. See Wang Xiaoye, Issues in the Drafting of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, 3 WASH. U. 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 285–86 (2004). There are also significant similarities to the European 
Community competition law. For discussion, see, e.g., Mark Furse, Competition Law Choice in 
China, 30 WORLD COMPETITION L. REV. 323, 334–40 (2007), and Harris, supra note 1. 
German competition law has been particularly important in the development of competition law 
in Europe, particularly in its early decades. For discussion, see Gerber, supra note 17, at 331–
61. 
 36. Volker Behr, Development of a New Legal System in the People’s Republic of China, 
67 LA. L. REV. 1161, 1162–64. 
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similarities between the Japanese and Chinese legal systems, there is 
significant interest in Japanese law for reasons similar to those 
mentioned above regarding German law. As a source of important 
content taken into Chinese law, Japanese law has been generally 
influential, and Japan is the East Asian country with the most 
experience in competition law. The vast differences between Japan 
and China and the lingering resentment in China regarding Japanese 
conduct in China during the past century tend, however, to diminish 
the status of Japanese influence among some Chinese. Korea’s 
experience with competition law is more recent and more limited 
than is Japanese experience, but some important similarities in the 
developmental contexts faced by the two systems make Korean 
experience valuable as well.  
3. Cognitive Structuring 
A third element in assessing cognitive influence refers to the ways 
in which the information is perceived among the relevant Chinese 
decision makers. Specifically, this includes the cognitive mechanisms 
that filter information and then configure it in the thought and 
discourse of Chinese decision makers. I here identify some of the 
factors that shape Chinese thinking about competition law issues. 
a. Chinese Language 
One key structuring factor is the Chinese language itself. The 
concept of “competition” was not part of the policy vocabulary in 
postwar China until after 1979, and it has acquired status only slowly 
since then. Until well into the 1990s, it appears to have been used 
primarily in a pejorative or at least vaguely suspect way. As Xiaoye 
Wang, one of China’s leading competition law experts puts it, 
competition was regarded as an “evil capitalist monster.”37 The 
language of “competition law” is even less familiar, and this lack of 
familiarity leads to uncertainty in processing and evaluating 
information relating to foreign law experience. For example, the 
 
 37. Xiaoye Wang, Asian Competition Forum, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Recent 
Developments in Chinese Legislation on Antitrust Law 2 (Dec. 12, 2005).  
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distinction between “efficiency” and “effectiveness” often seems to 
be blurred in discussions of competition law in China, even among 
the most knowledgeable experts in the area. This is not an inherent 
deficiency of the Chinese language, but rather reflects limited 
experience with the concepts and ideas that are part of U.S. and 
European competition law regimes. 
b. Political Rhetoric 
Political rhetoric also creates incentives and associations that tend 
to influence perceptions of foreign experience. For more than two 
decades, China has been pursuing what it calls a “socialist market 
economy.” This concept is rooted in an ideological framework that 
generally minimizes the intrinsic value of competition—i.e., 
competition for its own sake or the market as a form of social 
ordering. In this view, competition is valued solely for its 
consequences—specifically, its effectiveness in promoting economic 
development. For many, “competition” also has negative 
associations, because prior to 1979 it had long been considered 
antithetical to the goals of Chinese communism. “Competition” as a 
value is thus not only burdened with some negative associations, but 
even its positive valuations tend to be solely instrumental. As a 
consequence, this rhetorical scheme does not easily value a law that 
seeks to protect the process of competition other than for purely 
instrumental reasons. To the extent that this purely instrumental view 
of the value of competition law predominates, competition has no 
independent status, and it can thus easily be subordinated to other 
policy initiatives that may be considered more important for 
economic development at a particular time.  
c. Chinese Experience  
Chinese experience also shapes, colors, and tones the perception 
of foreign law and experience. Throughout Chinese history, 
governments have placed significant controls on economic activity, 
and the control of economic activity from 1949 until very recently 
was nearly total. As a consequence, there is little experience with the 
idea of protecting the process of competition, with the view that 
market forces should be unrestrained, or with the view that the 
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market should represent the central force in organizing economic and 
social life. Moreover, the history of the last century and a half in 
China has understandably generated strong resistance to foreign 
influence and control. Given that competition law is a foreign 
“import” that also is widely suspected of favoring Western economic 
and political interests, it is inevitably associated with the fears, 
concerns and issues associated with foreign control. Finally, perhaps 
the most fundamental factor in Chinese history is the belief that 
China is unique, “special.”38 It is not “the West,” although it seeks to 
emulate important aspects of Western development and to play on a 
global stage still dominated by Europe and the United States.39 This 
inevitably generates skepticism about the role and value of 
competition law in China. 
d. Role and Capacity of Institutions 
Finally, Chinese conceptions of the roles and capacities of 
Chinese institutions shape the incentives of those who make 
decisions about competition law. They play a major role in refracting 
foreign experience for use in developing competition law in China. 
These understandings of Chinese institutions also shape expectations 
regarding the costs and benefits of using particular institutions in 
particular ways in promoting compliance with the law.  
I mention here only two. One relates to the courts. Courts play 
central roles in U.S. antitrust law and are often also important in 
Europe. In using foreign experience, however, Chinese officials are 
aware that certain characteristics of courts in China differ 
significantly from those in the United States and Europe.40 For 
example, the independence of many courts in China remains 
somewhat dubious, at least in litigation that might be considered 
politically or economically sensitive, and many competition law 
 
 38. For discussion of China’s “new nationalism”, see PETER HAYS GRIES, CHINA’S NEW 
NATIONALISM: PRIDE, POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY (2004). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Mark Williams argues that deficiencies in the Chinese judiciary are a major obstacle 
to effective development of competition law in China. MARK WILLIAMS, COMPETITION POLICY 
AND LAW IN CHINA, HONG KONG AND TAIWAN 412–36 (2005). 
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cases are one or both.41 The government has undertaken steps to 
increase the independence of courts, and this has led to significant 
improvement in the area, especially in big cities like Shanghai and 
Beijing.42 Nevertheless, suspicions about the independence of the 
judiciary may have contributed to the lack of a significant role for 
them in the proposed competition law regime. An additional factor in 
assessing the potential role of the judiciary in a competition law 
system in China is that judges have rather limited training and 
capacity in the area of economic law, thus giving further incentives 
not to imbue them with authority in applying and enforcing 
competition law.  
Another perception of Chinese institutional capacity that plays a 
role in thinking about competition law relates to administrative 
decision making. The Chinese bureaucratic tradition is long and often 
distinguished. Its high status in contemporary China continues to give 
it authority and to provide incentives for entry into the bureaucracy. 
Many of the best and brightest in China are drawn to the central 
administration. Nevertheless, political factors may play major roles in 
their decision making and create incentives for bureaucrats to control 
economic processes rather than allow markets to evolve according to 
their own dynamics. This can create important issues concerning the 
ways in which decision making in the competition law area should be 
structured.  
These kinds of perceptions of the capacity of institutions in China 
to perform specific tasks in particular ways shape conceptions of how 
competition law can and should function—who should do what. They 
determine the kinds of issues that are likely to be entrusted to specific 
institutions as well as the levels of discretion they are likely to enjoy. 
This, in turn, shapes thought about the possibilities and limits of 
competition law in the Chinese context. 
 
 41. For discussion of developments in this area, see, e.g., Stephanie Balme, The 
Judicialisation of Politics and the Politicisation of the Judiciary in China (1978–2005), 5 
GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS 1 (2005), http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/vol5/iss1/art1. 
 42. For discussion on this topic, see, e.g., Mei Ying Gechlik, Judicial Reform in China, 
Lessons From Shanghai, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 97 (2005); Judge Jianli Song, China’s 
Judiciary: Current Issues, 59 ME. L. REV. 141 (2007).  
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B. Foreign Institutional Pressure 
Institutional pressure may also influence decisions regarding the 
content of competition law. In the Chinese context, however, the 
pressure is harder to define and often more subtle, because foreign 
institutions have relatively few direct tools for exerting such pressure. 
As distinct from cognitive influence—i.e., the influence of 
information, concepts and narratives on what decision makers 
know—the objective is to identify processes by which foreign 
institutions make requests on Chinese officials and explicitly or 
implicitly attach consequences to China’s responses to those 
demands. Given that there is often little or no access to information 
about the contents of discussions and meetings, it is difficult to 
ascertain the extent to which foreign institutions seek to apply such 
pressure directly. We can, however, identify indirect forms of 
pressure. In these cases, the foreign institution indicates its desired 
outcomes and indicates or implies that it is able to attach negative or 
positive consequences to China’s responses to its requests. Where an 
institution’s power to achieve such consequences is obvious and can 
be used with little cost to it, the potential to use that power may 
obviate the need for explicit reference to it. 
International organizations have sought to influence the general 
conception of Chinese competition law legislation as well as 
particular provisions of the law. For example, the WTO has referred 
to the importance of protecting against discriminatory use of 
competition law in both the Chinese accession agreement and in 
follow-up reports.43 Additionally, the OECD has sponsored and co-
sponsored several conferences on Chinese competition law in 
Beijing, including one in July 2007.44 In general, OECD discussions 
favor a “U.S.-style” competition law. Other relevant institutions such 
as the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) have been less certain that this model is appropriate for 
 
 43. For references and further discussion, see Furse, supra note 35, at 332–35. 
 44. According to Xiaoye Wang, “OECD in particular contributed greatly to the 
international symposiums organized jointly with the Chinese drafting group on Anti-Monopoly 
Law between 1997 and 1999, in which the draft law was discussed article by article.” Wang, 
supra note 35, at 285. 
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China.45 International institutions by themselves do not, however, 
have strong pressure levers within China. In contrast to many other 
countries that have needed loans and other forms of financial support 
form, the Chinese government has not needed loans or economic aid 
from international organizations, and thus the pressure they can exert 
is limited. 
Foreign governments have also exerted pressure regarding the 
shaping of the statute, particularly over the last several years. Again, 
this pressure is often indirect and difficult to identify clearly. U.S. 
antitrust enforcement officials have been particularly prominent in 
this context. Leading officials have made numerous trips to Beijing in 
which these issues have been discussed, and they have hosted 
relevant Chinese officials and scholars in the United States. They 
have generally sought to convince the Chinese to take an approach 
that is more in line with U.S. antitrust law and to move away from 
early drafts of the statute.46 In particular, they have urged that the law 
focus on horizontal conduct and minimize (or even eliminate) 
provisions relating to unilateral conduct and eliminate or weaken 
merger provisions.47 Foreign commentators have frequently 
expressed a concern that such provisions could be used to protect 
Chinese firms from foreign competition.48 In these circumstances, 
factors such as the status of U.S. institutions, the importance of US 
investment in China, and the roles of U.S. actors in important 
international contexts create substantial, and often indirect, pressure 
on Chinese decision makers to follow U.S. suggestions.  
 
 45. See, UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS, MODEL LAW ON COMPETITION: SUBSTANTIVE 
POSSIBLE ELEMENTS FOR A COMPETITION LAW, COMMENTARIES AND ALTERNATIVE 
APPROACHES IN EXISTING LEGISLATIONS (Jan. 5, 2007).  
 46. For an example of U.S. government positions in these talks, see William Blumenthal, 
Presentation to the International Symposium on the Draft Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (May 23–24, 2005), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/blumenthal/20050523 
SCLAOFinal.pdf.   
 47. Id. 
 48. See, e.g., Rebecca Buchman, China Hurries Antitrust Law, WALL ST. J., June 11, 
2004, at A7. 
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C. Domestic Incentives 
Powerful domestic interests attach to several key issues in the 
statute. These include, for example, substantive issues such as how to 
interpret the merger provisions in the legislation and institutional 
issues such as which institution or institutions within the bureaucracy 
should have responsibility for enforcing the competition law. As to 
these issues, there have apparently been serious controversies and 
discussions for years. With regard to most issues regarding the 
structure and style of the provisions, the specific language of 
particular norms, and the types of procedures to be employed, there 
are limited incentives for domestic institutions to seek influence. 
Here the lack of experience in competition law among the decision 
makers tends to blunt interest. The most fundamental issue, however, 
is whether the competition legislation will be enforced, and here 
groups such as SOEs have strong incentives to resist energetic 
enforcement of the law. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR COMPETITION LAW IN CHINA 
The two sets of factors that we have identified as impelling and 
shaping the Chinese competition legislation are likely also to 
influence decisions about its implementation. The absolute and 
relative weight of these influences will undoubtedly vary in the 
enforcement context. The incentives for SOEs to seek to influence 
enforcement decisions may, for example, increase in the context of 
implementation and thereby influence administrators making 
decisions in the area. In the first two stages of development of the 
law, uncertainties as to whether a competition law would actually be 
enacted as well as about its content may have reduced the force of 
those incentives. When the legislation is in place and can be 
implemented, however, the incentives will become correspondingly 
more immediate and pressing. As long as the law is not actually 
being implemented, the present value of avoiding potential future 
compliance costs is likely to be heavily discounted, but the rate of 
discounting alters when the statute is actually being implemented. 
Moreover, new and unanticipated factors may also be added to the 
mixture of interacting influences. For example, enforcement officials 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/12
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may face incentives to follow particular practices that are considered 
“best practices” by a group such as the International Competition 
Network (ICN). Nevertheless, the same officials will be subject to 
many of the same decisional influences as those they have faced in 
the first two stages of legal development. Identifying these factors 
enables us, therefore, at least to hazard some general comments about 
what can be expected to happen now that the statute has been 
enacted.  
One is that predictions about what is likely to happen are 
necessarily precarious. As we have seen, the decisional influences on 
competition law officials can swirl in many directions. They have 
been generally aligned with regard to the decision to enact a 
competition statute, but as to the law’s contents, these influences 
have often diverged and conflicted. These conflicts are likely to be 
even more pronounced where enforcement decisions are at issue. 
Administrative officials have incentives to make the law effective, 
but other political, ideological, and economic forces create incentives 
that might interfere with that goal. This lack of alignment of forces 
renders predictions exceptionally difficult.  
A second conclusion relates to the general disparity noted above 
between the alignment of interests regarding enactment of the law 
and those involving implementation of the law. Much of the support 
for enacting a competition law has involved China’s external 
relations. In part at least, it has been about signaling to the rest of the 
world China’s plans and intentions. In contrast, the potential impact 
of such a law on domestic institutions such as SOEs has played a key 
role in actually shaping the law. This reflects two distinct 
perspectives on China’s competition law project, one responding to 
international concerns and another that focuses on the more 
immediate and direct interests of Chinese officials and institutions. 
This may foreshadow significant divergence between the law as 
written and the law in actual practice. At a deeper level, it may 
suggest a situation in which the statute itself looks “Western,” but the 
underlying modalities of implementation remain distinctly Chinese. 
The incentives to make the statute look like Western models are 
likely to be stronger than the incentives to apply, interpret, and 
enforce it in line with those models. This dichotomy between form 
and actual operation may also be attractive to Chinese officials 
Washington University Open Scholarship










298 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 26:271 
 
 
because it provides a way of reducing conflicts and aligning interests 
among various elements of the bureaucracy.  
A third comment relates to the role of Chinese history and culture 
in shaping implementation. Here two images are likely to be 
particularly important. One is the perception of Chinese uniqueness 
mentioned above. This perception frames foreign views of 
competition law and Western experience as “alien” to Chinese reality 
and Chinese interests, and it may thus obviate the need to apply and 
interpret Chinese competition law along Western lines. This could, in 
turn, mean that decisions to enforce competition law against Chinese 
firms will be viewed differently from similar decisions regarding 
non-Chinese firms. This “uniqueness” also refers at another level to 
the intimate relationship between Chinese firms and the political 
institutions that either own or significantly control them. This 
relationship also helps to justify decisions to apply the law differently 
as between the two groups. As Chinese firms become global players 
themselves, the force of this justification may diminish. 
Finally, where decisional incentives and interests diverge and 
conflict and where they are attached to individuals and groups with 
significant political power, the implementation process is likely to be 
slow and cautious. The need to minimize disruptions in the economy 
as well as conflicts within the bureaucracy create strong incentives 
for officials to delay significant enforcement of the statute’s 
provisions. Moreover, in the post-enactment phase there is no 
immediate need to take enforcement action. To the extent that the 
enactment of the statute is intended to be a message to the outside 
world, enactment itself is the key factor. Whether and to what extent 
the legislation is enforced is less important for, perhaps, a relatively 
long period of time. Chinese officials also recognize their need for 
further knowledge about the likely consequences of their decisions. 
As discussed above, they have only in the last few years begun to 
develop an understanding of competition law systems, and thus they 
have strong incentives to proceed slowly and with caution in 
developing their procedures, practices, and operating norms. Most 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol26/iss1/12
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competition law systems have followed the same path of caution, and 
some Chinese administrators are also aware of that fact.49  
V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This brief Article has offered tools for analyzing legislative and 
enforcement decisions that are taken in the global arena and relate to 
global economic processes. Specifically, it provides a method for 
developing insights into the ways in which national and transnational 
influences interact in considering and making such decisions. This set 
of tools draws on forms of cognitive and institutional analysis that 
have not, to my knowledge at least, been systematically explored, but 
that hold great promise for analyzing legal development. 
Applying this analytical framework to the development of 
competition law in China has demonstrated some of its potential 
value. It has provided a means of identifying incentives facing 
Chinese decision makers and relating these decisional influences to 
each other. This allows us to gain insight into the decisional field that 
Chinese officials have faced in moving toward and shaping a Chinese 
competition law, and it also provides a means of identifying the 
influences that are likely to shape the decisions of Chinese 
enforcement officials in the future. 
 
 49. For similar strategies in the development of, respectively, German and European 
Community competition law, see GERBER, supra note 17, at 276–306, 348–58. 
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